By Uri Avnery, 13.5.06
PRISON SERVES an
important function in the annals of every revolutionary movement. It serves as
a college for activists, center for the crystallization of ideas, rallying
point for leaders, platform for dialogue between the various factions.
For the Palestinian liberation movement, prison plays
all these roles and many more. During the 39 years of occupation, hundreds of
thousands of young Palestinians have passed through Israeli prisons. At any
given time, an average of 10 thousand Palestinians are held in prison. This,
the liveliest and most active section of the Palestinian people, is in
continuous ferment. People from every class, every town and village, every
political and military faction are to be found there.
Prisoners have ample time. They have an opportunity to
learn, to think, to organize seminars, to concentrate full-time on the problems
of their people, to exchange views, to work out solutions.
In order to prevent an explosion, the Israeli prison
authorities allow these prisoners a large measure of communal life and
self-government. This is a wise policy. In practice, the prisons resemble camps
for prisoners of war. Clashes between the prisoners and the prison authorities
are comparatively rare.
ONE OF the
results is that, in prison, the inmates learn Hebrew. They watch Israeli TV,
listen to Israeli radio, become acquainted with the Israeli way of life. They
do not become Zionists, by any means, but come to know Israeli reality and even
to appreciate some of its components. Israeli democracy, for example. "What
we liked most," an ex-prisoner once told me, "was to see the Knesset
debates on TV. When we saw Knesset members shouting at the Prime Minister and
cursing members of the government, we really got excited. Where do you have
such a thing in the Arab world?"
This found its expression when Yasser Arafat and his
people came back to Palestine. The ongoing controversy between the returnees
from Tunisia and the "people from within" was not only a result of a
generation gap, but also of a difference of outlook. Arafat and his people have
never lived in a democratic country. When they thought about the future
Palestinian state, they had before their eyes the systems of Jordan, Egypt,
Tunisia and Lebanon. They were surprised when the young people, led by the
ex-prisoners, pointed towards the Israeli model.
Not by accident, almost all my Palestinian friends are
ex-prisoners, people who have spent a long time in prison, sometimes 10 and
even 20 years. I always wonder at the absence of bitterness in their mind. Most
of them believe that peace with Israel is possible and necessary. Therefore,
while many of them were critical of Arafat's way of governing, they
wholeheartedly supported his peace policy.
By the way, the outlook of the ex-prisoners reflects
somewhat positively on the prison authorities. Many of the prisoners had
undergone torture in the interrogation stage, when they were held by the
Shin-Bet, but after they reached prison, their treatment there has not left
many mental scars.
ALL THIS comes as
an introduction to the central event of this week: the agreement achieved in
prison between the representatives of all the Palestinian factions.
This is a document of very great importance for the
Palestinians, both because of the identity of its authors and its content.
At this time, many leaders of the various Palestinian
factions are in prison, from Marwan
Barghouti, the leader of Fatah in the West Bank, to Sheik Abd-al-Khaliq
al-Natshe, a Hamas leader. With them there are the leaders of Islamic Jihad,
the Popular Front and the Democratic Front. They spend their time there in a
permanent discussion, while keeping constant contact with the leaders of their
organizations outside and the activists inside. God knows how they do it.
When the leaders of the prisoners speak with one
voice, what they say carries a greater moral weight than the statements of any
Palestinian institution, including the presidency, the parliament and the
government.
THIS IS
the background, against which this fascinating document should be examined.
In general, it follows the policy of Yasser Arafat:
the Two-State solution, a Palestinian state in all the territory occupied in
1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, the release of all Palestinian
prisoners. This means, of course, the recognition of Israel in practice.
For the Israeli public, the most problematical part
concerns, as usual, the refugee problem. No Palestinian leader can give up the
Right of Return, and this document, too, raises this demand. But in practice,
the Palestinians acknowledge the fact that this problem can be solved only in
agreement with Israel. That means that return to Israel must necessarily be
limited in numbers, and the greater part of the solution lies in a return to
the Palestinian state and payment of compensation. There is a difference
between the recognition of the Right of Return in principle, as a basic human
right, and the exercise of this right in the real world.
An important part of the document concerns putting the
Palestinian house in order. The body that is supposed to represent the whole
Palestinian people, inside and outside the country, is the PLO. That is also
the body that has signed all the agreements with Israel. But the PLO is now far
from reflecting the domestic Palestinian political reality. Hamas, which came
into being at the beginning of the first intifada, is not represented at
all. The same goes for Islamic Jihad. The document demands that both be
represented in the PLO - a reasonable and wise demand. It also calls for new
elections to the all-Palestinian parliament - the Palestinian National Council,
and for a National Unity Government.
THE PRISON agreement
can help Hamas to cope with the new reality - and that is, probably, one of the
main motives of its authors.
The sweeping victory of Hamas in the Palestinian
parliamentary elections was a surprise not only for Israel and the world, but
also for Hamas itself. The movement was completely unprepared for assuming the
responsibilities of power. The new situation creates a severe contradiction
between the ideology of Hamas and the requirements of a governing party. As
Ariel Sharon said: "What you see from here you don't see from there."
This contradiction finds its expression in the
declarations of different leaders of Hamas. This is not duplicity, but rather
an expression of different reactions to a new reality. The point of view of
Khaled Mashaal in Damascus is necessarily quite different from the point of
view of Ismail Haniyeh, the new Prime Minister in Gaza. Political and military
leaders also often see things differently.
That is a natural confusion, and probably more time
will pass before a consensus is achieved and a joint position defined. No
wonder, therefore, that leaders are voicing opinions that contradict each
other. One is seen on Israeli TV declaring with much pathos that "we
demand not only Jerusalem, but also Haifa, Besan and Tiberias", while
another asserts that the movement "will not recognize Israel until it
returns to the 1967 borders" - a "no" that implies a
"yes".
The prison agreement is designed to help in creating
the new consensus, which should enable Hamas to conduct a policy based on a
compromise between the ideology and theology of the movement and the
requirements of the Palestinian people.
The possible line: the PLO, led by Mahmoud Abbas, will
conduct negotiations with Israel and present the agreement (if there be one)
for ratification by a Palestinian referendum. Hamas will undertake in advance
to accept the result. At the same time, Hamas will declare a Hudna (armistice)
for many years, allowing an end to violence from both sides.
THAT IS possible. The question is whether the Israeli
government wants it. At the moment, it does not look like it.
It openly calls for the defining of the
"permanent borders" of Israel unilaterally, with the annexation of
large areas of territory. Such a policy necessitates a situation of "no
partner". This means that the
government will reject anything that might create a credible partner, one who
would also be accepted by the world.
During the show trial of Marwan Barghouti, we - my
colleagues and I - stood outside the hall, carrying posters that said:
"Send Barghouti to the negotiation table and not to prison!" But the
appearance of this document suggests that sending him to prison was perhaps the
biggest favor the Israeli government could have done him and the Palestinian
people.